Federal Assistance and the Changing Focus of State Planning: State Planners Assess the 701 Program and General Revenue Sharing by Pajari, Roger N.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 5 
Number 1 (Fall) Article 4 
November 1977 
Federal Assistance and the Changing Focus of State Planning: 
State Planners Assess the 701 Program and General Revenue 
Sharing 
Roger N. Pajari 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pajari, Roger N. (1977) "Federal Assistance and the Changing Focus of State Planning: State Planners 
Assess the 701 Program and General Revenue Sharing," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 5 : No. 1 , Article 
4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol5/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
Federal Assistance and The Changing Focu s of State Planning 
State Planners Assess the 701 Program 
and General Revenue Sharing 
ROGER N. PAJARI 
Georgia Southern College 
The author gratefu lly acknowledges the financial assistance given by 
Georgia Southern College Research Fund which made the field research 
possible . Time and facilities for writing were provided by the National En-
dowment for the Humanities . The latter assistance and the helpful sugges-
tions of Professor Vernon Van Dyke and Dr. Lee S. Greene, who read earlier 
drafts of th e paper , are also gratefu lly acknow ledged. 
State planning in the United States is historically associated with the 
programs and financial assistance of the federal government. It was first 
initiated under the impetus of the Public Works Administration in the 1930's, 
which made funds available to states for the establishment and staffing of state 
planning boards .1 All states had such boards by 1939. The dissolution of the 
PWA and the drying up of federa l funds during World War II , howev er, 
reversed the sit uation. State planning boards became inactive , were 
abolished, or were merg ed into other governmenta l units. By the end of 
World War II , state planning as a separate ly identifiable activity had almost 
entire ly disappeared. Loss of federal government financial assistance was 
again one of the major factors triggering this demise. 2 The few boards remain-
ing attempted to plan the transition from war to peace and to promote 
economic development. 3 
The Federal Housing Act of 1954 revived planning at the state leve l. It 
provided that funds for housing in nonmetropolitan communities be chan-
neled through the states, and required the states to plan in order to qualify. 4 
Typically the states asked their economic development agencies to do the 
planning and to administer federal funds obtained. 5 In 1959 Congress 
amended Section 701 of th e Housing Act of 1954 by authorizing financial 
1 Robert N. Cornett, "State Planning, " The Book of the States, XVIII (Lexington , Ken-
tucky: The Council of State Governments, 1970-71), p . 438; and The Council of State Govern-
ments, State Planning and Federal Grants (Chicago : Public Administration Serv ice, 1969), pp. 14 
and 15. 
2 The Council of State Governm ents , pp. 14-15 and The Council of State Governments, 
Planning Services for State Government (Chicago : Council of State Governments, 1956), p. 24. 
3 The Council of State Governmen ts, State Planning and Federal Grants , p . 17. 
4 Housing Act of 1954, 68 Stat . 640 (1954) and Thad L. Beyle and Deil S. Wright , .. The 
Governor, Planning, and Governmental Activity ," in The American Governor in Behavioral 
Perspective , eds. Thad Beyle and Oliver J. Williams (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 
1972), p. 194. 
5 Cornett, p. 439. 
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support for state comprehensive planning. 6 Federal assistance under section 
701 has come to be known as the 701 program. Although a few state planning 
programs were operated without federal financial support in the mid 1960's, 
most of them were related to national policies established under the 701 
program. 7 Federal influence in shaping state planning was even greater a 
decade after the amendment of section 701. By then it was common for the 
national government to require states to submit plans with applications for 
many kinds of categorical grants-in-aid , and to act as coordinators of state 
functional planning. 8 The national government's influence on state planning 
also increased because of the adoption of approximately 38 additional planning 
assistance programs to finance state functional planning . 9 However, the 701 
program has remain 'ed the sole source of federal aid for state comprehensive 
planning . 
In sum , state planning has gone through distinct states: (1) planning public 
works, (2) planning economic development programs, (3) administering urban 
planning programs and funds, and most recently (4) comprehensive, func-
tional , coordinative planning. In all but one of these stages the effect offederal 
requirements , standards, and assistance has been to push state governments 
into planning. 10 By 1971 all fifty states once again had planning agencies. 11 
The future of state planning programs would therefore appear to be closely 
linked with federal requirements, standards , and financial aid. Changes in 
federal aid would be particularly important to the states that are more exten-
sively utilizing such aids, whereas those states which have institutionalized 
their planning operations and finances largely around state needs and funds 
would be less affected. 
To increase the financial, management and planning capacities, as well as 
th e independence and effectiveness of state government, the Nixon and Ford 
administrations have proposed alterations or extensions of two federal assis-
tance programs. The first is the 701 program and the second is the general 
revenue sharing program. 12 The Nixon administration secured a $25 million 
reduction in 701 program funds in 1974 and a further reduction of$25 million 
6 Housing Act of 1959, Sec. 419, 73 Stat . 678 (1959), 40 U.S.C. 461 (1970). 
7 Walter K. Johnson , "State Planning ," The Book of The States , XVI (Chicago: The Council 
of State Governments , 1966-67), p. 428. 
8 David K. Hartley , "State Planning," The Book of the States , XVII (Chicago: The Council 
of State Governments , 1968), p. 433. 
9 U. S. Congress , Senate , Committee on Appropriations , Budget Recisions and Deferrals, 
1975 H.R. 3260. 94th Congress , 1st sess., 1975, pp. 78-79. 
10 James C. Strouse and Philippe Jones , "Federal Aid: The Forgotten Variable in State 
Policy Research, " The Journal of Politics XXXVI (February , 1974): pp . 200-207; Cornett , pp . 
439-440 and The Council of State Governments , State Planning and Federal Grants , p. 5. 
11 Vincent T. Smith , Jr ., "State Planning ," The Book of The States , X1X (Lexington , 
Kentucky : The Council of State Governments , 1972-73), p. 445. 
12 U. S. Department of Treasury , Office of Revenue Sharing , General Revenue Sharing The 
First Planned Use Report (Washington , D. C.: Government Printing Office), p. land The State 
and Local Assistance Act, 86 Stat . 919 (1972). 
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was proposed by the Ford administration in 1975. 13 The proposed reduction 
was coupled with a far reaching proposal for modifying the administration and 
purposes of the 701 program. 14 These measures illustrate the attempts to 
move away from categorical grants in aid which typically impose national 
government controls on state operations receiving federal funds. While at-
tempting to cut back on the 701 program, the Ford administration has urged 
Congress to continue and expand the general revenue sharing program , which 
in its opinion returns "decision-making power and authority to state and local 
governments." 15 This Act "imposes no planning requirements on states and 
localities receiving funds , and no funds are earmarked for planning or for 
evaluation. "16 State planning is directly involved in the outcome of the debate 
over the future of the 701 program and revenue sharing. 
This paper has four purposes: (1) to summarize arguments of scholars, 
politicians and planners for and against the continuation of the 701 program 
and general revenue sharing; (2) to examine interstate variations in the at-
titudes of some senior state planners toward proposed cutbacks in 701 plan-
ning assistance and toward the continuation and expansion of revenue sharing 
as an alternative form of federal assistance to states; (3) to provide a possible 
explanation for interstate variations in these attitudes; (4) and finally to de-
scribe the significance of these fmdings for the future development of state 
planning. State planners from nine states in the southeastern portion of the 
United States were selected for the study. All of these states are members of 
the Southern Council of State Planning Agencies. Senior planners in each of 
the state planning offices participated in hour long semistructured interviews, 
conducted largely in the winter and spring of 1975. In all but three of these 
states, two or more planners were interviewed. 17 Four of the sixteen inter-
13 U. S. , President , "Budget Restraint, The President 's Message to the Congress ," Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents X (Washington , D. C.: Office of the Federal Register, 
National Archives and Records Service, November 26, 1974), Gerald R. Ford , 1974, pp . 1500-
1501; and U. S., President, "Federal Taices and Spending , The President's Address to the 
Nation," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents XI (Washington , D. C. : Office of the 
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service , October 6, 1975), Gerald R. Ford , 
1975, pp. 1125-1128; and U. S., President , "Supplement to Message on Budget Recisions and 
Deferrals," Federal Register 39, No. 235, Part IV, 5 December , 1974, 42519-42669. 
14 U. S., Congress, House , Responsioe Government Act , H.R . 10581, 93rd Cong. , lstsess ., 
1974 and Hugh Mields , Jr ., "The Federal Comprehensive Planning Grants Program : Prospects 
for the Future," State Planning Issues , (Lexington , Kentucky : The Council of State Planning 
Agencies and the Council of State Governments , Secretariat , 1974), p. 13. 
15 U. S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Revenue Sharing , General Revenue Sharing 
the First Planned Use Report , p. 1. 
16 U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development , Revenue Sharing and the 
Planning Process: Shifting the Locus of Responsibility for Domestic Problem Solving, by the 
Subcommittee on the Planning Process and Urban Development of the Advisory Committee to 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of 
Sciences National Academy of Engineering, 1974), p. 44 and p. 54. 
17 The number of planners interviewed by state are: Alabama, 1, Arkansas, 2, Florida , 2, 
Georgia, l, Louisiana , 2, Mississippi, 2, North Carolina , 2, South Carolina, 1, and Tennessee, 3. 
Total 16. 
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viewed were executive directors of their state planning agency. The remain-
ing twelve were selected on the basis of referrals by executive directors. The 
states from which the respond ents wer e chosen were selected because of their 
geographic proximity to the author and because budgetary limitations pre-
cluded the inclusion of planners from more distant states. 
CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES TOWARD FEDERAL 
SUPPORT FOR STATE PLANNING 
Much of the contemporary interest in comprehensive state planning can 
be attributed to the 701 program. 18 Under the 701 program , the federal 
government will pay two-thirds of the cost of state-wide planning. 19 This 
financial inducement along with the increasing variety of planning activities 
eligible for such funds has resulted in an increasing number of states engaging 
in comprehensive planning. By 1965, 29 states had federally aided planning 
programs and by 1967 the number had gone up to 44. 20 
In his budget message to Congress of November 26, 1974, President Ford 
sought to reduce federal expenditures by reducing the level of 701 funding 
from $100 million for fiscal year 1975 to $50 million and deferring the remain-
ing amount for use in 1976. 21 In its review of the President's propos ed deferral 
of 701 appropriations, the Senate issued a report 22 praising the accomplish-
ments of state planning under the 701 program and listing arguments for the 
program's retention. These arguments suggested that the program helps to 
coordinate functional state planning , thereby making other federally assisted 
state programs more effective; and that it enhances state management capac-
ity by providing "a coordinative management framework. "23 This is due in 
part to the fact that the 701 program has encouraged governors to become 
more concerned with comprehensive planning and program coordination. 24 
Oth er claims for 701 included the arguments that it helped states to establish 
and identify their goals25 and to develop "policy and decision-making docu-
18 The Council of State Governm ents, State Planning and Federal Grants , p. 17. 
19 Hartl ey, p. 433. 
20 Johnson, p. 429. 
21 U. S. , Presiden t, "Budget Restrain t, The President' s Message to The Congress," Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents , p. 1501; and U. S., President , "Supplemen t to Message 
on Budget Recisions and Deferrals," Federal Register 39, p. 42643. 
22 U. S., Congress , Senate, Report on Resolution Disapproving Deferral of Budget Author-
ity , Section 701, Comprehensive Planning Grants Program, Housing Act of 1954, S. Rep t. No. 
94-23, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975. 
23 U. S., Congress, Senate , Submission of a Resolution Disapproving Proposed Deferral of 
Budget Autho,ity Under the Housing Act of 1954, S. R. 23, 94th Cong ., p. 576 and U. S., 
Congress, Senate, Submission of a Resolution Disapproving Deferral of Budget Autho,ity Under 
the Housing Act of 1954, S. Res. 451, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 14 December 1974, Congressional 
Record 119: S21521. 
24 Mields , Jr ., p. 14. 
25 U. S., Congress, Sena te, Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 1973 
fl ousing and Urban Development Legislation, fl ea rings before the Subcommittee on Housing and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking , Housing, and Urban Affairs. 93rd Cong. , 1st 
sess., 1974, pp . 689-690. 
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ments and tools" which make better short term and long term decision-
making possible. 26 Finally, advocates repeatedly stress the fact that the 701 
program is the only federal program which assists recipients in comprehensive 
planning. 27 
Critics of 701 funding say that "the comprehensive planning program's 
future can hardly be described as bright and/or promising. "28 Despite the 701 
program's expansion in scope, time, and money, the critics claim that real 
solid accomplishments are hard to pin down. Few if any states have com-
prehensive planning programs meeting the criteria outlined in section 701. 
Most state planning agencies have not succeeded in coordinating functional 
and special project plans. The 701 program has not succeeded in "reconciling 
the many informal unlabeled planning functions taking place in given problem 
areas." Many state executive branches are decentralized with numerous 
departments and agencies having their own bureaucracy , vested interests, 
approaches, vocabularies, analytic frameworks and preferred solutions to 
problems. Coordination of functional planning and effective comprehensive 
planning by a single state agency is difficult because of this and also because 
many federal categorical grant is aid programs operate along functional 
lines. 29 Dispersion of program responsibilities is hence inevitable. Further, 
the lack of program coordination at the national level makes coordination at 
the state level more urgent , but much more difficult. Probably equally damn-
ing to the 701 program is the claim that the plans called for by most federal 
grants are not true plans, but rather documents assuring proper state man-
agement of federal funds. 30 Such documents often do not follow recognized 
long range state goals but are merely incremental deviations from last year's 
budget. In sum "very little bona 6de state planning is being generated or 
required by federal categorical programs. "31 
State planners interviewed for this study confirm the criticism on the 701 
program just outlined. None of the states covered has a comprehensive state 
plan. Many state planners suggested that comprehensive planning is impossi-
ble and that coordination of functional plans by a state planning agency, even 
though required by state statute, is difficult, if not impossible, given the legal , 
structural and political make-up of state governments. 
Despite state planners' concurrence with the criticism of the 701 program, 
they are not at all in agreement or willing to support the Ford administration's 
proposals to cut back on 701 funding. State planners interviewed were asked: 
26 Ibid. 
27 U. S., Congress , Senate, Submission of a Resolution Disapproving Deferral of Budget 
Authority Under the HotLSing Act of 1954, S. Res. 451, 93rd Cong., p. S21521. 
28 Mields , pp. 13-14. 
29 U. S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Reven ue Sharing and The 
Planning Process: Shifting the Focus of Responsibility for Domestic Problem Solving , p. 24 and the 
Council of State Governments , State Planning and Federal Grants , pp . 17-18. 
30 The Council of State Governments, State Planning and Federal Grants , pp. 17-18 and 
Terry Sanford , Storm Over the States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p . 192. 
31 The Council of State Governments , State Planning and Federal Grants , p. 25. 
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"What effect will President Ford 's proposed cut in 701 expenditures have on 
state planning in (name of state)?" 
Responses to the latter question can be grouped into three categories: (1) 
negative (bad) impact , (2) neutral or minor impact and (3) positive (good) 
impact. States , grouped by response types are as follows: 
TABLE I 
State Planners Perception of Impact of Cuts in 701 Planning 
Assistance on State Planning 
Negative Impact 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Neutral or Minor Impact 
Florida 
Georgia 
Positive Impact 
Alabama 
Tennessee 
With the exceptions of respondents in Tennessee and Alabama , all respon-
dents opposed cutting of 701 funds. 
Respondents from states perceiving a negative impact of cuts in 701 funds 
made statements suggesting that their planning programs have still not 
hatched or are still in such early stages of development that their survival 
without federal support is doubtful. Implicit also is the recognition that 
elected officials have yet to recognize the role of planning in state government 
and have not yet learned to utilize planning services. Without such recogni-
tion , state funding is doubtful. 
Planners in Georgia and Florida perceived cuts in 701 funds as having a 
neutral or minor impact on their state's planning activities . These states 
apparently have institutionalized their planning programs to such an extent 
that they would survive without federal 701 funding . The planners' comments 
suggest that the national government was initially very important in the 
establishment of their state planning programs. In at least one of these states 
strong support from recent governors has furthered the institutionalization 
process. 
Planners in two of the states perceived cuts in 701 funding as a good thing 
which would eventually have a positive effect on their planning programs . To 
these planners , federal assistance has made state planning excessively 
oriented to federal policies , as opposed to state needs. While cut backs in 701 
funds would hurt the programs initially, the longer term impact would be to 
force planners to prove their worth to elected state officials. In addition these 
planners strongly suggest that the planning paid for with federal funds is 
ineffective and hence a waste of money and time. 
With few exceptions , all of the state planners interviewed decried the 
paternalism of the national government. They viewed federal planning re-
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quirements as ineffective in that they result in plans which are not true plans , 
but funding documents , and they held that more often than not federal 
priorities come to be regarded as more important than state priorities. Less 
federal intrusion in state planning and administration is seen as desirable. Yet 
imbedded in this mind set is a major conb·adiction: the large majority of these 
planners are unwilling to advocate the termination of the 701 program or the 
planning requirements attached to federal categorical grants in aid. They favor 
federal money without strings , yet they perceive the state as unwilling to fund 
or institute planning. Hence the planner ends up favoring strings which would 
require and help institutionalize the planning process at the state level. 
EXPLAIN! G INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN PLANNERS' 
ATTITUDES TOWARD 701 ASSISTA CE 
A possible explanation of interstate variations in planners ' attitudes toward 
cuts in 701 spending is that state governments are in various stages of in-
stitutionalizing their planning programs. States which institutionalize a plan-
ning program are states whose planning programs are more firmly established 
in state law, have firmer support from political or governmental sources within 
the state , and rely less extensively on fiscal resources outside the state for 
carrying out planning. oninstitutionalized state planning programs are 
largely a product of, and a perpetuation of, external mandate , or fiscal in-
ducements , and are likely to disappear when such forces outside the state 
disappear . 
The process of institutionalization is related to both urbanization and state 
reliance on outside fiscal assistance, and provides a means of relating these 
factors. Research conclusions by Thad Beyle and Deil S. Wright indicate that 
lower urbanization and state reliance on federal funds are related and that 
"states that rely most on state funds are richer , more urban , considerably 
more metropolitan and twice the size of the other states . "32 These findings 
suggest reasons for variations in planners' attitudes toward cuts in 701 fund-
ing. Highly urban states , being more wealthy and more financially self reliant , 
would utilize fewer 701 funds , and hence have planners who perceive the cuts 
as having a neutral or marginal impact. Non urban poorer states , being more 
dependent on national government funds , would have planners who view cuts 
in such funds as having a bad impact on their state. 
Institutionalized state planning programs are grounded more firmly in 
state law. Institutionalized planning programs would be required in state 
constitutions or in state statutes, whereas noninstitutionalized programs are 
likely to operate on the basis of executive order or adminisb·ative mandate. 
The existence of constitutional or statutory provisions is evidence of state 
commitment. This is much less the case where state planning is simply a 
product of executive order. State planners operating in states whose planning 
32 Beyle and Wright , pp. 201-202. 
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programs are a result of executive order would likely view the cutback in 701 
funds negatively, whereas state planners who work in states whose planning is 
grounded in statutory or constitutional provisions are likely to be more secure 
and view 701 cuts neutrally or possibly positively. 
Another measure of institutionalization of state planning is extent of 
gubernatorial support. States with governors having extensive statutory and 
constitutional powers are likely to have more fully institutionalized planning 
programs. Planning is a major tool of executive leadership and management. 
Strong governors are likely to promote the development of state planning 
programs. One would therefore expect planners in states with weak governors 
to view 701 cuts more negatively than planners in states with strong gover-
nors. Strong governors can compensate for the decline in federal support. 
Urbanization, utilization of 701 funds, state statutory bases for planning, and 
strong formal powers in the governor are all variables related to institutionali-
zation. 
The following suggests that institutionalization is related to variations in 
planners' perceptions of cuts in 701 funds. The relationship between the data 
on urbanization and utilization of701 funds from Table II is shown in Figure I. 
The data in Figure I suggest that the relationship is not linear and that the least 
and most urbanized states appear to utilize smaller per capita amounts of 701 
funds . The per capita utilization of 701 funds increases as the states' urban 
population increases from 44 percent to 50 percent and declines slightly and 
levels off between 50 percent and 60 percent. With the exception of one state, 
states with pop\llations 60 percent urban or more decrease their per capita use 
of 701 funds, especially as they approach a population which is 80 percent 
urban. The data suggest that the states which would suffer the largest per 
capita loss from a cut in 701 funding would be those whose populations are 
changing from rural to urban (48 to 58 percent urban). It is likely that these 
states are experiencing an increased need for planning but have legislatures 
that are still reluctant to fund the planning programs adequately. Hence their 
greater push for utilization of 701 funds. The least urbanized states use 701 
funds less , probably because the pressures for more planning have not yet 
developed sufficiently. A concomitant of urbanization is increased inter-
dependence among people making the need for rational systematic ap-
proaches to decision making more evident. Systematic development of plan-
ning, budgeting, and management procedures and skills are likely responses. 
The lower per capita utilization of701 funds in the most urbanized states does 
conform with the Beyle and Wright findings. Lower per capita utilization of 
701 funds may be explained by the fact that these states have governments 
which fund planning activities more extensively. 
When the groupings of perceived impacts of 701 cuts in Table I are 
imposed on Figure I, it is evident that states whose planning is in embryonic 
form have low per capita utilization of 701 funds. These are also the least 
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Ark. 
Ala. 
S. C. 
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Bad Impact Good Impact 
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La . 
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Percent of State Popu lation Living in Urban Areas in 1970 
FIGURE 1. The nine states arranged according to per capita 701 expenditures 
in 1974 and the percent of state population which is urban. 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
Tennessee 
South Carolina 
TABLE II 
Urbanization and State Utilization of 701 Planning Assistance 
Percent of Estimated State 1974 Total 
Population Urban Population 701 
In 1970 (b) 1974 ( a) Assistance ( c) 
58.4 3,577 ,000 $548,123 
50.0 2,062,000 377,200 
80.0 8,090,000 659,351 
60.3 4,882 ,000 488,143 
66.1 3,764,000 456,587 
44.5 2,324,000 176,459 
45.0 5,363,000 496,000 
58.8 4,129 ,000 414,000 
47.6 2,784,000 385,500 
1974 Per 
Capita 701 
Assistance 
15¢ 
18¢ 
8¢ 
10¢ 
12¢ 
7¢ 
9¢ 
10¢ 
14¢ 
(a) U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of The Census, Current Population Reports Population Estimates and Projections, Social and 
Economic Statistics Series P-25, No. 539 (Washington, D . C.: Government Printing Office, 1975). 
(b) U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of The Census, U. S. Census of Population 1970, Vol. I, Part A. (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office). 
(c) U. S., Congress, Senate, ''Total Statewide Comprehensive Planning Assistance Under 701 for Fiscal Year 1974," 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 14 
December 1974, Congressional Record 120: S.21521-S.21523. 
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urbanized states which Beyle and Wright suggest rely more on federal sup-
port. These programs could possibly suffer a death blow from such cuts. The 
states "appear to be 'pulled ' into such planning efforts by the availability of 
federal planning grants. "33 Planners in these states believe 701 cuts will have a 
negative impact on planning in their states. Of the states whose planners 
perceive 701 cuts negatively , Mississippi and South Carolina operate their 
state planning programs on the basis of executive orders. 34 All of the other 
states included in this study have planning agencies which operate on the basis 
of statutes calling for some form of comprehensive planning . 35 In sum, low 
levels of urbanization , greater reliance on federal assistance, and the lack of 
strong legal bases for planning contribute to the negative perception of 701 
funding cuts. 
States whose planners perceive a cut in 701 funds as having a good impact 
are presumably sufficiently urbanized to have experienced the need for 
planning, but have not yet received sufficient state financial support for their 
programs to make them self-sustaining. Hence their very high utilization of 
701 funds. The 701 cut is therefore perceived as a triggering mechanism to 
bring state planners and state elected leadership together . 
Florida and Georgia have planners who oppose the 701 cuts, but believe 
their planning programs would remain fairly intact even if cuts occur . These 
are the most urbanized states and presumably most pressed to engage in 
planning, and as Beyle and Wright suggest, fund it out of state revenues . 
Other research conclusions suggest that these states "are 'pushed' to use their 
own funds to a greater extent to achieve the necessary planning effects. "36 
Lower per capita 701 utilization, statutory based planning, as well as strong 
gubernatorial support all contribute to the greater institutionalization of plan-
ning in the neutral impact states. 
Planners in Georgia , Louisiana , and Florida all mentioned the key role of 
gubernatorial leadership in securing an established role for planning in state 
government. Such support is crucial for institutionalization of state planning. 
The planning programs likely to suffer the most from cuts in 701 funding are in 
those states which have the weakest governors. In Table III the nine states 
analyzed here are arranged according to the relative power of their governors 
and the likely impact of701 cuts on planning programs . With the exception of 
Florida, all of the states which would experience a negative impact from a cut 
in 701 funds (See Figure I) have weak governors. And with the exception of 
33 Ibid ., p. 201. 
34 Mississippi, Governor , Executive Order 55, Executive Department , Jackson, State of 
Mississippi , August 15, 1973 and South Carohna, Governor , Executive Order , Executive De-
partment , Columbia , State of South Carohna , December 23, 1971. 
35 For example see Tennessee , Tennessee Code Annotated , Title 13 (1972); North Carohna, 
General Statutes of North Carolina, Article 36, 143-337 (1971); Florida, Florida Statut es, Chapter 
23. 011-23. 019; Alabama, Alabama Statutes , Act No. 657 (1969) and Louisians , Louisiana Revised 
Statutes , Act. No. 288 (1968). 
36 Beyle and Wright , p . 201. 
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Louisiana, the states with strong governors have planners who perceive a cut 
in 701 funds as having either a neutral or good impact on their planning 
programs. The data seem to indicate that strong executive leadership can 
compensate for cut backs in federal assistance to state planning programs, and 
can serve as a critical force in bringing about the institutionalization of state 
planning around state needs and priorities. As recently as the ear ly 1970's 
state planning activities were still relatively isolated from the governor. By 
1975 this pattern is the exception. The latter development could conb·ibute to 
the further institutionalization of state planning, especially if this results in 
sb·onger governors. 
TABLE III 
Relationship Between Power of State Governor and Impact of 701 Cuts on 
State Planning Programs in Nine Southern States 
Power of State Governor( a) 
Strong 
Weak 
Impact of 701 Cuts on 
State Planning Program(b) 
Good to 
Neutral Impact 
Georgia 
Alabama 
Tennessee 
Florida 
Bad Impact 
Louisiana 
South Carolina 
Mississippi 
orth Carolina 
Arkansas 
(a) See Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Combined Index ofThe Formal Powers of Governors ," in 
Politics in The American States, eds. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1971), p. 232. 
(b) See pages 5-6 of this paper for explanation. 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARI G AND ITS RELATIONSHIP 
TO STATE PLAN ING 
Federal categorical and block grants in aid have been exb·emely important 
in shaping the scope and content of state planning programs. In large measure 
they have provided the funds for instituting state planning and have made plan 
formulation and program coordination more important concerns in state 
government. This kind of federal involvement in state government affairs has 
prompted much criticism. Typical are claims that such aids result in (1) federal 
dominance of state decision making, (2) distortions of state government 
budgeting, (3) excessive red tape and huge bureaucracies, (4) waste of money 
(since many federal programs conflict with each other and duplicate each 
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other), and (5) the subordination of state agencies to the point of becoming 
field offices of the federal government. 37 Many of these criticisms are echoed 
in the comments of state planners and Ford Administration officials on the 701 
program. 
The Nixon Administration and the Congress believed that revenue sharing 
would strengthen state and local political institutions by giving them financial 
relief, decentralizing government decision making , eliminating overlapping 
programs , and reducing the power and role of the federal bureaucracy. 38 
Revenue sharing was viewed as a substitute for some categorical grant in aid 
programs. Under general revenue sharing , state governments can spend 
revenue sharing money "in any area of activity in which they may spend the 
state's own funds. "39 Under revenue sharing , the federal government ceases 
the effort to settle the states' priorities. 
Because state planning is largely required by grant in aid requirements , 
the shift from grants in aid to revenue sharing could be viewed as a threat to 
programs which have not yet been institutionalized around state needs. The 
Ford administration's proposals to reshape the 701 program to stress man-
agement as opposed to planning , and to reduce the level of701 funding by one 
half must be seen as parts of a larger program of reshaping state-federal 
relationships. From this larger perspective , revenue sharing can be viewed as 
a setback for professionals in function-specific state departments and agencies 
and a boost for generalists. Deil S. Wright suggests that revenue sharing was 
promoted most forcefully by generalists : governors, mayors, county commis-
sioners and city managers . The latter, he suggests, constituted an alliance 
against "the accumulated influence of the program professionals ," such as 
administrators and planners in fields such as housing , highways, hospitals, and 
higher education. 40 
State planners are in a peculiar position when discussing state-federal 
relationships. On the one hand their jobs are very likely a product of federal 
grant in aid requirements , and on the other hand they are directly involved in 
the negative experiences commonly associated with satisfying those same 
requirements. Changes in financial , administrative, and power relationships 
between the state and federal government affect them and state planning 
37 Thomas R. Dye , Politics in States and Communities , 2d ed (Englewood Cliffs: Prentic e 
Hall , Inc ., 1973), pp . 58-59. 
38 Carl W. Stenberg , "Revenu e Sharing and Governmental Reform," The Annals of the 
Ameri can Academy of Political and Social Science 419(May, 1975): 61; Murra y L. Weidenbaum , 
"What Will Revenue Sharing Accomplish?" Duns , July, 1973, p. 11; Thomas J. Graves, "JGR and 
the Executive Branch: The New Federalism ," The Annals of the America,1 Academy of Political 
and Social Science 416 (Novem ber, 1974): 48; and Richard P. Nathan , Allen D . Manvel and 
Susannah E. Calkins , Monitoring Revenue Sharing (Washington , D . C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion , 1975), p. 263. 
39 U. S. Department ofTreasury , Office of Reve nue Sharing , General Revenue Sharing the 
First Planned Use Report, p . 2. 
40 Deil S. Wright , "Revenu e Sharing and Structural Features of American Federalism," The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 419 (May, 1975): 111. 
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dir ectly. Their perspective on the continuation and possible alteration of th e 
general revenue sharing program and its impact on state planning will be 
described here. 
In 1972 revenue sharing funds given to state governments constituted , on 
the average, two percent of their general expenditures. For six of the nine 
states covered in this study, the figure was betwe en two and three perc ent. 41 
It is clear , therefor e, that revenue sharing is not yet a huge item in state 
budgets. Continuation and expansion of the program could alter this signifi-
cantly. The planners interviewed in this study were asked "Wh ere has (nam e 
of stat e) spent its general revenue sharing mon ey?" Responses indicate that 
these states have spent it mostly on capital improv ements and on nonrecur-
ring activities in fields such as highways , education and mental health. In 
some states th e mon ey was put into the general fund and was not funneled into 
particular departments. The Actual Use Reports filed with the Office of 
Reve nu e Sharing are not an accurate means of de termining the use of general 
revenue sharing funds since such funds can easily be substituted for state 
money in many program areas. 42 It is eve n more difficult to determine 
whether such funds have be en used in a departm ent for planning purposes. 
State plann ers were asked: " In your opinion has th e revenu e sharing 
program had any impact on your state's functional and/or comprehensive 
planning efforts? If so, explain ." The responses indicate that six out of the nin e 
planning programs have exper ienced little if any impact from th e general 
revenue sharing mon ey. Typical statements are as follows: 
"In (stat e) plann ers a.re hardly aware of reve nu e sharing." "Reve nu e 
sharing has had virtually no impa ct on state planning activities in (stat e)." 
In one of the six states the respond ent went on to say that "new federalism 
has not enco urag ed the state to deve lop its planning proc esses." 
Plann ers in North Carolina, Alabama , and Tenn essee made statements 
indicating that general reve nu e sharing has not impacted neutrally on state 
planning. Negative influences wer e felt initially in North Carolina and Ten-
nessee: 
" In some ways reve nue sharing initially impact ed negatively in (stat e) 
because it was accompanied with drastic cutbacks in other federal 
categorical aids." 
"Reve nu e sharing has hurt efforts of planners at th e state and local leve l. 
For example, the elimination of'workable program req uirements ' has cut 
the props from und er local planning ." 
Only one plann er among th e sixteen int erv iewe d perceived reve nu e 
sharing as having had a positiv e impact : 
41 Mathan , Manve l and Calkins , p. 95 and 337. 
42 U. S. Congress , Senate , Committ ee on Governm ent Operations. Replies by Members of 
Congress to a Questionnair e on General Revenue Sharing, by The Int ergovernmenta l Relations 
Subcomm ittee (Washington , D . C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. v. 
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"Even though (state) revenue sharing money has not gone specifically for 
planning, I believe it has had a positive indirect effect on state planning 
functions. This is because revenue sharing has supplemented scarce state 
funds, making more of these available for state planning." 
Though most state planners deny benefit from general revenue sharing, 
and though a few think it has had a negative impact, this does not necessarily 
indicate an overall judgment. To get such a judgment, the planners were 
asked the following questions: "Would you say most of the professional 
planners working for the state of (name state) are in agreement in their 
attitudes toward revenue sharing?" "Do they mostly favor or not favor this 
form of federal government assistance? Why?" 
Planners in five of the nine states said they believed state planners were 
fairly unified and supportive, whereas planners in one state said some diver-
sity of sentiment was evident. In the remaining three states the respondents 
refused to speculate or estimate the unity of other plrumers' sentiments on this 
subject, but they did not hesitate to speak of their own attitudes. All but one 
were favorable. Typical of the responses were statements such as these: 
" ... general revenue sharing is a good thing. General revenue shru·ing 
... does give states much needed latitude in decision making." 
The latter respondent went on to say that he firmly believed that revenue 
sharing 
" ... should not supplant 701 funding. Revenue sharing coupled with 701 
funds can help to build or improve state planning. The utilization of 
revenue sharing can be potentially improved and enhanced by continued 
use of 701 funds." 
Other planners said: 
"I believe most state planners will favor revenue sharing because, in 
theory, it represents a step away from federal paternalism. State planners 
do not want state governments to become mere field offices for our 
federal government. [They] would favor continuation offederal categori-
cal grants and especially block grants, to supplement revenue shru·ing." 
"I do not believe general revenue sharing is a good substitute for federally 
funded 701 planning assistance. General revenue shru·ing is never likely 
to find its way into state planning programs. Special revenue sharing 
programs could possibly overcome this deficiency, however." 
"Revenue sharing is an excellent form of federal assistance to state and 
local governments because it puts the planning shoes on state and local 
governments where the power really is. It will make plruming more 
relevant to state needs .... " 
" ... revenue sharing can be effective from a planner's perspective only if 
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such funds are tied in with and coordinated with a hierarchy of plans 
involving regional and state comprehensive plans." 
Endorsement of this form of assistance to the states was not unqualified, as the 
last response indicates. In five of the nine states, the responclents strongly 
suggested that revenue sharing should not be a substitute for 701 funding or 
for other federal categorical or block grants. Several respondents suggested 
that 701 funding is more important since the inauguration of revenue sharing 
because more professional planning and management are essential if states are 
to utilize the money most effectively. Implicit in these caveats is the fear that 
revenue sharing as the only form of federal assistance would soon lead to the 
demise of many state planning programs. Yet such fears are not sufficient to 
overcome an obvious distaste for federal supervision and paternalism in 
planning and managing programs. 
In endorsing general revenue sharing some state planners indicated that 
they were not entirely happy with revenue sharing in its present form. In four 
states they cited weaknesses in revenue sharing as it is now carried on. The 
following statements indicate what some of these weaknesses are: 
" ... initially it was accompanied by drastic cutbacks in other categorical 
aids."" ... gives money in such inconsequential amounts that problems 
can't really be solved." " ... it distributes money without regard to 
need." 
"The existing law does not prevent states from overconcentrating or 
excessively dispersing such funds." 
" ew federalism is a myth, since even under it the national government 
continues to exercise a great deal of oversight and supervision." 
"It has been viewed as a short term program. A source of'funny money' 
resulting in states guarding against becoming dependent on it." 
" ... states spend revenue sharing money less judiciously than money 
they have to raise themselves. This would be remedied if it were made a 
permanent program." 
Other criticisms of the general revenue sharing program are evident in the 
responses state planners made to the following question: "What changes, if 
any, do you think should be made in our current general revenue sharing 
program which might improve state planning programs?" Planners in seven 
state agencies said that it should be expanded and made a permanent federal 
program. Three of the respondents suggested the inclusion of planning re-
quirements in federal revenue sharing legislation, while a fourth hinted at the 
same thing by saying: 
"Revenue sharing would be improved if states were required to submit 
more detailed planned expenditure reports to the Office of Revenue 
Sharing as a prerequisite for receiving revenue sharing funds." 
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Two of the state planners believe the inclusion of planning requirements 
would not be politically feasible and that such requirements would merely 
increase federal paternalism without improving state planning very much. 
Other suggestions for improving the revenue sharing program included 
the suggestion that the amount of funding under the program be expanded 
and that restrictions be adopted to prevent undue concentration or dispersion 
of funds in state programs. No clear grouping of attitudes toward general 
revenue sharing is evident. In sum, it appears that state planners support the 
continuation and expansion of general revenue sharing, but not as a substitute 
for existing federal categorical and block grant in aid programs, particularly 
the 701 program. 
CO CLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE OF FIND I GS 
State planning has not become institutionalized around state government 
needs, programs and p1iorities in most southern states. In all but two of the 
nine states studied here , the curtailment offederal assistance via categorical or 
block grants requiring state planning would have a potentially lethal effect on 
state planning programs. This is especially so in those states that are least 
urbanized and that have governors whose formal powers are weak. States that 
have strong governors and that are in the process of becoming highly ur-
banized are likely to meet cutbacks in 701 funding with increased state 
appropriations for planning. State planners in the most urbanized states view 
their major support as coming from executive leadership , not the state legisla-
tures. 43 Continued dependence on federal assistance such as is available 
under section 701 may perpetuate a kind of planning which is least relevant for 
state needs. The planners interviewed agree with the summary of criticisms of 
the 701 program contained in this paper , yet are largely opposed to the 
program's termination. 
General revenue sharing has tended to strengthen the powers of state 
governors by giving them discretionary funds. However, it is likely that this is 
less true in states where governors lack strong budgetary powers. Of the states 
included in this analysis only Georgia, Tennessee and Alabama have gover-
nors with full budget powers. 44 With the exception of Florida , states granting 
the weakest budgetary powers to the governor are precisely the states whose 
planning programs tend to be least developed. Hence the likelihood of 
general revenue sharing becoming a source of support for planning in the 
states most devoid of such support appears remote. 
A switch in the form of federal assistance from 701 and other categorical 
aids to general revenue sharing would be most harmful to state planning 
programs which have yet to be institutionalized around state programs, 
priorities, and funding. Unfortunately this includes almost all of the state 
planning programs studied here . 
43 Intervi ews with state planners in Georgia and Florida , Spring , 1975. 
44 Dye, p. 178. 
